

# Introduction to Windows exploitation

7 juillet 2011

## Why this talk ?


- System most used
- No courses about windows internal
- Fun

## Why this talk ?

- System most used
- No courses about windows internal
- Fun

## For who ?

- Curious people
- Need some base on application exploitation
- Knowledge assembly language



## Process Environment Block

- Image Base Address
- BeingDebugged ( IsDebuggerPresent() )
- Start Address of the heap
- Information about loaded modules

- EPROCESS
- ntdll
- NtCreateUserProcess()
- IMAGE\_OPTIONAL\_HEADER
- OsMajorVersion, ...

## Thread Environment Block

- Location of PEB
- Location of the stack ( start & end )
- First entry in the SEH chain
- NT\_TIB 0x018 ( 0x1C )
- Last error
- Process ID, Thread ID
- Can be accessed by segment FS.

```
void *getTEB()
{
    void *teb = NULL;

    __asm__("movl %%fs:0x0, %0" : "=r" (teb) : : );
    return (teb);
}
```


7FFDC000	00001000		data block of thread 0000053C	Priv	RW	RW
7FFDD000	00001000		data block of main thread	Priv	RW	RW
7FFDE000	00001000			Priv	RW	RW

```

D Dump - 7FFD0000..7FFDDFFF
7FFD0000 0012F8BC (Pointer to SEH chain)
7FFD0004 00130000 (Top of thread's stack)
7FFD0008 0012D000 (Bottom of thread's stack)
7FFD000C 00000000
7FFD0010 00001E00
7FFD0014 00000000
7FFD0018 7FFD0000
7FFD001C 00000000
7FFD0020 00000E2C
7FFD0024 00000020 (Thread ID)
7FFD0028 00000000
7FFD002C 00000000 (Pointer to Thread Local Storage)
7FFD0030 7FFDE000
7FFD0034 00000000 (Last error = ERROR_SUCCESS)
7FFD0038 00000000
7FFD003C 00000000
7FFD0040 E2C02870
7FFD0044 00000000
7FFD0048 00000000
7FFD004C 00000000
  
```

```

D Dump - 7FFDE000..7FFDEFFF
7FFDE000 00 00 01 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 40 00 00 1E 24 00 ..0. .@.AA$
7FFDE010 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 06 98 7C ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE020 00 10 91 7C E0 10 91 7C 01 00 00 00 70 29 39 7E ..010@e10...p5!
7FFDE030 00 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE040 C0 05 98 7C FF FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..05 98 7C FF FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE050 00 00 6F 7F 88 06 6F 7F 00 00 FB 7F 00 10 FC 7F ..00 6F 7F 88 06 6F 7F 00 00 FB 7F 00 10 FC 7F
7FFDE060 00 20 FD 7F 02 00 00 00 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..20 FD 7F 02 00 00 00 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE070 00 00 98 07 60 E8 FF FF 00 00 10 00 00 20 00 00 ..00 98 07 60 E8 FF FF 00 00 10 00 00 20 00 00 00
7FFDE080 00 00 01 00 00 10 00 00 08 00 00 00 10 00 00 ..00 00 01 00 00 10 00 00 08 00 00 00 10 00 00 00
7FFDE090 C0 CF 98 7C 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 ..C0 CF 98 7C 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00
7FFDE0A0 78 81 98 7C 05 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 00 05 ..78 81 98 7C 05 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 00 00 05
7FFDE0B0 02 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..02 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE0C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE0D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE0E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE0F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE100 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE110 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
7FFDE130 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  
```





## jump / call reg

- Register that points to shellcode
- Find opcode into loaded dll

## jump / call reg

- Register that points to shellcode
- Find opcode into loaded dll

## pop return

- No register point to shellcode
- Magic stack (first, second, . . . address of the stack )

## push return

- No opcode jmp / call
- Find Push reg ; ret

## push return

- No opcode jmp / call
- Find Push reg ; ret

## Safedisc

- Macrovision
- SimCity 3000, Need for speed 2 ...
- File .exe & .icd
- Buffer overflow
- Push XXX ret
- Obfuscation ?
- bp WriteProcessMemory
- jmp 0x0

```
jmp [reg + offset]
```

- Register doesn't point at the beginning of shellcode

## jmp [reg + offset]

- Register doesn't point at the beginning of shellcode

## blind return

- Overwrite EIP with a ret instruction
- Hardcode Address of the shellcode into esp

## Software Exception Handler

- Gestionnaire d'exceptions
- `__try / __except / __finally`
- `ExitProcess()`

## Software Exception Handler

- Gestionnaire d'exceptions
- `__try / __except / __finally`
- `ExitProcess()`

## Exception's type


Hardware Exception :

- `ACCES_VIOLATION`
- `DIVISION_BY_ZERO`

Software Exception :

- `RaiseException()`
- `NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY`
- `BAD_FILE_FORMAT`
- ...





## Défaut

Default seh exception (UnhandledExceptionFilter()).

BaseProcessStart.

WinMain().

JustInTimeDebugging.

## SEH Struct


```
typedef void* PVOID;  
  
typedef struct _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD  
{  
    struct _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD *next;  
    struct PVOID Handler;  
}EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD;
```

## SEH Struct

```
typedef void* PVOID;  
  
typedef struct _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD  
{  
    struct _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD *next;  
    struct PVOID Handler;  
}EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD;
```

## How it works?

- ntdll !KiUserDispatchException
- Top of linked list store in fs :[0] (TEB)
- Update of this top address after each call
- Bottom linked chain is FFFFFFFF. (Os take the hand)



Demo Time

## A simply example in ASM


```
push handler
push fs:[0]
mov fs:[0], esp
; ...
; Code protected by SEH ?
; ...
pop fs:[0]
add esp, 4
ret
```

## Stack when exception handler called

```
EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION __cdecl _except_handler(  
    struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD *ExceptionRecord,  
    void *EstablishFrame,  
    struct CONTEXT *ContextThread,  
    void *DispatcherContext  
);
```



## HOW TO



Demo Time

## tElock

- Old Packer but fun
- Lots of division by zero / int3
- IAT Redirection
- Get Context thread
- Clear DebugRegister

## Presentation


- Sup XP SP2
- /SAFESEH
- IMAGE\_LOAD\_CONFIG\_DIRECTORY32
- SEHandlerTable
- SEHandlerCount
- ntdll !RtlIsValidHandler

```
BOOL RtlIsValidHandler(Handler)
    if (handler is in image)
        if (image has no IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_SEH flag)
            return FALSE;
        if (image has a SEH Table)
            if (handler found in seh table)
                return TRUE;
            else
                return FALSE;
    if (handler is on a non-exec page)
        if (ExecuteDispatchEnable bit set in KPROCESS)
            return TRUE;
        else
            raise ACCESS_VIOLATION;
    if (handler is not in an image)
        if (ImageDispatcherEnable bit set in KPROCESS)
            return TRUE;
        else
            return FALSE;
```

## Bypass it

- Adress From a module without /SafeSEH, IMAGE\_DLLCHARACTERISTICS\_NO\_SEH
- Instruction from a predictable spot in memory
- Adress from the Heap

Demo Time





## SEHOP

- Windows Server 2008
- HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager
- \kernel\DisableExceptionChainValidation
- RtlDispatchException()
- 0xFFFFFFFF

## Presentation

- Since XP SP2
- STATUS\_ACCESS\_VIOLATION
- Page Table Entry
- /NXCOMPACT
- SetProcessDEPPolicy

## DEP options

- OptIn : System process, chosen process by user
- OptOut : All system process, user can discard some process
- AlwaysOn : All process
- AlwaysOff : Nothing

## Bypass it

- WinExec (Ret-into-libc)
- Mark page as executable
- Alloc, copy, jump
- Change DEP Settings

## Function

- VirtualAlloc()
- HeapCreate()
- SetProcessDEPPolicy()
- NtSetInformationProcess()
- VirtualProtect()
- WriteProcessMemory()

Function/OS	XP SP2	XP SP3	Vista SP0	Vista SP1	Win 7	2008
VirtualAlloc()	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
HeapCreate()	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SetProcessDEPPolicy()	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
NTsetInformationProcess()	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no
VirtualProtect()	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
WriteProcessMemory()	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

## VirtualAlloc()

```
LPVOID WINAPI VirtualAlloc(  
    __in_opt    LPVOID lpAddress,  
    __in        SIZE_T dwSize,  
    __in        DWORD flAllocationType,  
    __in        DWORD flProtect  
);
```

## Need

- Return Address
- Setup correctly stack
- Copy
- Jump

## HeapCreate()

```
HANDLE WINAPI HeapCreate(  
  __in      DWORD fOptions,  
  __in      SIZE_T dwInitialSize,  
  __in      SIZE_T dwMaximumSize,  
);
```

## Need

- HeapAlloc()
- Return Address
- Setup correctly stack
- Copy
- Jump

## SetProcessDEPPolicy()

```
BOOL WINAPI SetProcessDEPPolicy(  
    __in    DWORD dwFlags  
);
```

## Need

- Work only on XP SP3, Vista SP1, 2008
- Return Address
- Stack ( only 0 )

## NtSetInformationProcess()

```
NtSetInformationProcess(  
  __in HANDLE      ProcessHandle,  
  __in PROCESS_INFORMATION_CLASS ProcessInformationClass,  
  __in PVOID       ProcessInfo,  
  __in ULONG       ProcessInformationLength  
);
```

## Need

- Windows XP, Vista SP0, 2003
- Proper stack
- Return address



## VirtualProtect()

```
BOOL WINAPI VirtualProtect(  
    __in    LPVOID lpAddress,  
    __in    SIZE_T dwSize,  
    __in    DWORD flNewProtect,  
    __out   PDWORD lpflOldProtect  
);
```

## Need

- Work Everywhere
- Proper Stack
- Return Address

## Return Oriented Programming

- Use code from the stack won't work
- Gadget
- Existing Instructions
- Build a chain of instructions
- Return from one instruction to an other one

## SEH

- Pop pop ret Not Possible
- Code Execution on stack failed
- Rop Chain
- Bypass Execution Prevention
- Way to return to our payload

## First Step : Stack pivot


- `add esp, XXX ; ret`
- `mov esp, [reg] ; ret`
- `xchg [reg], esp ; ret`
- `call [reg]`
- `push [reg] + pop esp ; ret`


## Second Step : Setup stack / registers

- Instruction ; ret = Rop gadget
- VirtualProtect
- 5 parameters

## Final Stage

Execute Shellcode





Demo Time



## Presentation

- > Vista
- Image, stack, heap, TEB, PEB
- Seven, each execution

## System parameter

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager  
\Memory Management\MoveImages

- 0 : Disable
- 1 : All processus
- IMAGE\_DLLCHARACTERISTICS\_DYNAMIC\_BASE (PE Header)
- /dynamicbase

## Bypass it

- Partial overwrite
- Load module without aslr
- Second vulnerability ( read memory )
- `ntdll!_KUSER_SHARED_DATA (0x7ffe0300) -> ntdll!KiFastSystemCall`

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- Partial overwrite
- Load module without aslr
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- `ntdll!_KUSER_SHARED_DATA (0x7ffe0300) -> ntdll!KiFastSystemCall`

## Heap Spraying

```
var x = new Array();  
  
for (var i = 0; i < 200; i++) {  
    x[i] = nop + shellcode;  
}
```

## Presentation

- Visual Studio 2002
- Like SSP
- /GS
- 4 octets
- 2 \* 0x00
- GetCurrentProcessId, GetTickCount,  
QueryPerformanceCounter

## CVE-2007-0038

```
void fail(char *src, int len)
{
    struct {
        int a;
        int b;
    } buf;
    memcpy(&buf, src, len);
}
```

## Bug

- No string buffer detected
- Size controlled by the user

## Another Failed

```
void fail(int count, int data)
{
    int    array[10];
    int    i;

    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
        array[i] = data;
}
```

## Fix

- VS 2005
- `#pragma strict_gs_check(on)`

Vérification de la sécurité de la mémoire tampon Non (/GS-)

```

00411400 55          PUSH EBP
00411401 8BEC       MOV EBP,ESP
00411403 81EC E4000000 SUB ESP,0E4
00411409 53        PUSH EBX
0041140A 56        PUSH ESI
0041140B 57        PUSH EDI
0041140C 3D8D 1CFFFFFF LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-E4]
00411412 B9 39000000 MOV ECX,39
00411417 B8 CCCCCCCC MOV EAX,CCCCCCCC
0041141C F3:AB     REP STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
0041141E 8B45 08    MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00411421 58        PUSH EAX
00411422 8D4D E0    LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-20]
00411425 51        PUSH ECX
00411426 E8 70FCFFFF CALL bypass_g.0041109B
0041142B 83C4 08    ADD ESP,8
0041142E 52        PUSH EDX
0041142F 8BCD     MOV ECX,EBP
00411431 58        PUSH EAX
00411432 8D15 54141000 LEA EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[411454]
00411438 E8 40FCFFFF CALL bypass_g.0041107D
0041143D 58        POP EAX
0041143E 5A        POP EDX
0041143F 5F        POP EDI
00411440 5E        POP ESI
00411441 5B        POP EBX
00411442 81C4 E4000000 ADD ESP,0E4
00411448 3BEC     CHP EBP,ESP
0041144A E8 E7FCFFFF CALL bypass_g.00411136
0041144F 8BE5     MOV ESP,EBP
00411451 5D        POP EBP
00411452 C3        RETN

```

Vérification de la sécurité de la mémoire tampon Oui (/GS)

```

00411400 55          PUSH EBP
00411401 8BEC       MOV EBP,ESP
00411403 81EC E8000000 SUB ESP,0E8 1
00411409 53        PUSH EBX
0041140A 56        PUSH ESI
0041140B 57        PUSH EDI
0041140C 8D8D 18FFFFFF LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-E8]
00411412 B9 3A000000 MOV ECX,3A
00411417 B8 CCCCCCCC MOV EAX,CCCCCCCC
0041141C F3:AB     REP STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
0041141E A1 00704100 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[417000] 2
00411423 33C5     XOR EAX,EBP
00411425 8B45 FC    MOV EDWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EAX
00411428 8B45 08    MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0041142B 58        PUSH EAX
0041142C 8D4D DC    LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-24]
0041142F 51        PUSH ECX
00411430 E8 66FCFFFF CALL bypass_g.0041109B
00411435 83C4 08    ADD ESP,8
00411438 52        PUSH EDX
00411439 8BCD     MOV ECX,EBP
0041143B 58        PUSH EAX
0041143C 8D15 68144100 LEA EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[411468]
00411442 E8 36FCFFFF CALL bypass_g.0041107D
00411447 58        POP EAX
00411448 5A        POP EDX
00411449 5F        POP EDI
0041144A 5E        POP ESI
0041144B 5B        POP EBX
0041144C 8B4D FC    MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
0041144F 33CD     XOR ECX,EBP
00411451 E8 BEFBFFFF CALL bypass_g.00411014
00411456 81C4 E8000000 ADD ESP,0E8
00411459 53        PUSH EBX
0041145E 8D3FCFFFF LEA EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[411136]
00411463 8BE5     MOV ESP,EBP
00411465 5D        POP EBP
00411466 C3        RETN 3

```

## How TO

- Bypass using Exception Handling
- Bypass by replacing cookie on stack and in .data section
- Bypass because not all buffers are protected
- Bypass by overwriting stack data in functions up the stack
- Bypass because the cookie is static ?



## Example

```
void foo(char *src)
{
    char buffer[100];
    try
    {
        strcpy(buffer, src);
    }
    catch (char *str)
    {
        printf("Bhuitre\n");
    }
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    foo(argv[1]);
    return (0);
}
```

Demo Time

- Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
- Control the activation ( DEP, SEHOP, ASLR )
- Specific process

Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit

System Status

Data Execution Prevention (DEP)  Always On

Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)  Application Opt In

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)  Application Opt In

[Configure System](#)

Running Processes

Process ID	Process Name	DEP	Running EMET
5156	WINWORD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6512	ieexplore	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4448	msnmsgr	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
976	OUTLOOK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1104	ieexplore	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2560	sflst	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
3544	WUDFHost	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
388	csrss	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
944	FEPClientUI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
4716	FwcMgmt	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
972	rundll32	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
380	svchost	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
1280	svchost	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
1752	FwcAgent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
3524	explorer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
7068	cmd	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
2528	vmnat	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
556	lsm	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
2324	sftvsa	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
1732	FPMAgent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

The changes you have made may require restarting one or more applications

[Configure Apps](#)

## 6 protections

- SEHOP
- DEP (program without /nxcompat)
- Anti Heap Spraying
- Null dereferencing pointer
- ASLR (program without /DYNAMICBASE)
- Export Address Table Filtering

|

nject Dll (EMET.dll)

Protections/OS	XP SP3	Vista SP1	Win7
GS + SafeSEH	Use data area	Use data area	Use data area
GS + SafeSEH + DEP	Ret-into-libc / Rop	Ret-into-libc / Rop	Ret-into-libc / Rop
GS + SafeSEH + SEHOP		Recreating proper chain, use data area	Recreating proper chain, use data area
GS + SafeSEH + SEHOP + DEP		Recreating proper chain, Rop	Recreating proper chain, Rop
GS + SEHOP + ASLR		Difficult	Difficult
GS + SEHOP + ASLR + DEP		Difficult	Difficult

## Thanks

- LSE
- Epita / Epitech
- thrashboul / delroth

## Questions ?

